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Abstract 
 
The distribution of power between the executive branch and the legislative branch in the 
realm of foreign policy is a delicate balance and one that has been debated since the Founding 
Fathers met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.  The debate has gotten no less intense and no 
less crucial in the modern, nuclear age, and it remains unresolved.  The Reagan administration’s 
foray into Nicaragua during the 1980’s and its confrontations with Congress during that time 
period illuminate the complexities of the power-sharing arrangement in foreign policy and offer 
the ideal case study of executive-legislative war power.  The lessons to be drawn from America’s 
involvement in Nicaragua are that the expanded Presidential power in the realm of foreign policy 
are necessary for the safety of the country in today’s world, but dangerous without the vigorous 
oversight and ultimate check by Congress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U.S. Foreign Policy, Nicaragua, Ronald Reagan, Contras, War Power, Foreign Policy, Executive 
Branch, Legislative Branch, President, Congress  
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Madison, Hamilton, and Reagan:  
The Limits of Executive Power in Foreign Policy and the Reagan 
Intervention in Nicaragua 
“Some people say this isn't America's problem. Why should we care if Nicaragua is a democracy or not? Well, we 
should care for a whole host of reasons.  Democracy has its own moral imperatives, as you well know, but it also 
has advantages that are profoundly practical. Democratic states do not attack their neighbors and destabilize 
regions. Democratic states do not find it easy to declare and carry out war. Democratic states are not by their 
nature militaristic. Democracies are traditionally reluctant to spend a great deal of money on arms. Democratic 
states have built-in controls on aggressive, expansionist behavior because democratic states must first marshal 
wide popular support before they move.”  
-Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a Fund-raising Dinner for the Nicaragua Refugee Fund, April 15, 
19851 
 
 Ronald Reagan received thunderous applause as he concluded his remarks to a crowd of 
potential donors to the “Nicaragua Refugee Fund,” a group composed mainly of influential 
Republican lawmakers and their wealthy donors.2  But then came the icing on the cake for the 
famously skillful orator.  Reagan invited to the podium a gift-bearing, 8-year-old Nicaraguan 
refugee named Patricia, whom he promptly lifted into the air and kissed on the cheek.3  The irony 
of Reagan’s remarks, the most significant of which are captured above, was likely lost on the 
bedazzled and sympathetic spectators.  While expounding on the “moral imperatives” and 
“advantages” of democracies, Reagan’s own administration was ushering the United States into a 
militaristic phase, in which it acted aggressively in Nicaragua, and spent a great deal of money 
on arms for the Contra rebels in an attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government, all without 
marshaling either wide popular support or broad Congressional support.4   
                                                
1 John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online] (Santa Barbara, CA).  
Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Fund-raising Dinner for the Nicaragua Refugee Fund,” April 15, 1985 in Woolley 
and Peters, The American Presidency Project.  <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38474> (accessed 9 
February 2010).  
2 Elizabeth Kastor, “Reagan’s Night for the Refugees,” Washington Post, April 16, 1985, C1.  
3 Elizabeth Kastor, “Mistaken Identity: Reagan and the Child Refugee Who Wasn’t,” Washington Post, April 18, 
1985, D1. It was later discovered that Patricia Guerra was not a Nicaraguan refugee, but was, in fact, born and raised 
in the United States. 
4 Reagan, “Remarks at a Fund-raising Dinner for the Nicaragua Refugee Fund,” in Woolley and Peters. 
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America’s involvement in Nicaragua can be seen as a battleground over executive power, 
fought between the Reagan administration and elements of Congress, within the context of 
America’s Cold War foreign policy.  The conflict is part of a larger, more fundamental debate 
over the delegation of war-making power in the United States Constitution.  It is a battle that has 
been waged over many years, with most scholars of foreign policy arguing that power has 
gradually slid from the Congress to the Presidency.5  However, it is a debate that remains 
unresolved.6  The case of Nicaragua is particularly instructive because it illustrates a time when 
the boundaries were contested in a series of executive orders, legislative maneuvers, loophole 
evasions, and even deceit and illegality. In the protracted dispute over intervention in Nicaragua, 
Congress fought back against executive encroachment on the legislative branch’s foreign policy 
powers, as part of a broader backlash against executive power following the Vietnam War.7 In 
essence, Nicaragua is instructive because it illustrates a moment in which the Reagan 
administration argued that the complexities of modern foreign policy necessitated executive 
foreign policy-making power unencumbered by Congressional oversight and public support.8   
Congress and important segments of the public retorted with a full-throated and forceful rebuke.9  
What Nicaragua clearly illustrates is that 200 years after the writing of the Constitution, the 
arrangement between Congress and the President over waging war, still has not been settled.  It 
                                                
5 Robert DiClerico, The American President, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentince Hall, 2000), pp. 33-39.  
Presidents have unequivocally exercised less restraint in their conduct of war, particularly when it comes to 
committing troops to combat and giving notice to Congress of military action, as history has progressed.  DiClerico 
points specifically to Truman ordering forces to aid South Korea and Johnson committing troops to the Dominican 
Republic as prime Cold War examples.  One exception to greater executive power in foreign policy is following the 
Vietnam War when Congress attempted to reassert its constitutional war-making powers with the War Powers 
Resolution and Hughes-Ryan Amendment.   
6 Charlie Savage, “Attack Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent,” New York Times, March 21, 2011.  
President Barack Obama’s actions in Libya were heavily criticized by members of Congress who argued that they 
were unconstitutional.   
7 Ibid., p. 38. 
8 Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991). 
9 Joel Brinkley and Stephen Engelberg eds., Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra 
Affair, with the Minority View (New York: Random House, Inc., 1988). 
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also shows that the answer to waging modern warfare is not simply to circumvent the prescribed 
role of Congress in foreign policy.  Instead, Nicaragua demonstrates that there must be some 
type of flexible and fluid power-sharing agreement between the two branches of government in 
order to meet the contemporary demands of foreign policy-making in the nuclear age.    
 It is this back-and-forth between Congress and the Reagan administration over American 
intervention where the question of primacy in foreign policy and American involvement in 
Nicaragua meet.  This paper begins with a brief history of the constitutional debate over foreign 
policy in America, beginning with the founders and ending with contemporary scholars and 
Supreme Court decisions.  The paper then gives a brief historical background to the American 
involvement in Nicaragua.  The heart of the paper is a very specific discussion of developments 
in the American involvement in Nicaragua and an examination of its constitutionality.  The 
underlying themes throughout the saga between Congress and the President are security and 
liberty.  In essence, those who argued for a stronger executive were essentially making the claim 
that swift and secretive military action was necessary for the nation’s security.10  The proponents 
of greater Congressional control over foreign policy argued that liberty and democratic control 
could only be preserved under a transparent and cooperative execution of military action.11 
Finally, the paper concludes by summarizing the significance of the Nicaraguan intervention to 
American foreign policy and putting it into the context of today’s foreign policy challenges for 
the United States. 
                                                
10 William Hyland, ed., The Reagan Foreign Policy (New York: New American Library, 1987). 
 Caspar Weinberger, “U.S. Defense Strategy,” in: Hyland, ed., The Reagan Foreign Policy. 
11 Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State (New York: Penguin Press, 
2010). 
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 The founding fathers could not have foreseen the nature of executive-legislative relations 
in an age when nuclear weapons have the potential to destroy entire civilizations.12  Nonetheless, 
they gave much thought to how Congress and the President should work together.  In attempting 
to convince the nation that it ought to adopt the Constitution with Federalist #48, James Madison 
explains that a government with distinct branches must inherently build in overlapping powers.  
“Unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give to each a constitutional 
controul [sic] over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to a 
free government, can never in practice, be duly maintained.”13  This paper is the story of how 
President Ronald Reagan and the United States Congress attempted to work out their 
complicated, overlapping power-sharing arrangement in foreign affairs from 1981 to 1986 and 
the lessons the nation must learn from it.  Publius, Madison’s pseudonym, leaves his readers with 
one prescient and particularly germane question to our investigation.  “Will it be sufficient to 
mark with precision the boundaries of these departments in the Constitution of the government, 
and to trust these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power?”14   
  
                                                
12 John C. Yoo, Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush   
(New York: Kaplan Publishing, 2009). 
13 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers (1787-1788; repr., New York: Bantam 
Dell, 2003), p. 300.   
14 Ibid., p. 301. 
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The Constitution and Foreign Policy 
 
“What should be the role of public opinion in setting policy … in foreign policy?  The public’s part should be at 
once expansive and limited.  It should be expansive in the sense that it determines the basic ends to be pursued.  It 
should be limited in the sense that it leaves the details of how an end is to be achieved to others who have the kind 
of detailed knowledge a general public can never – and need never possess.” 
 -Everett C. Ladd, Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, 200115 
“Just what our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions, must be 
divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.  A 
century and half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less 
apt quotations from respected sources on each side of any question.  They largely cancel each other.  And court 
decisions are indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow 
way.” 
 -Justice Robert Jackson, Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer16 
 
I.  The Founding Fathers 
In the wake of the revolutionary war, the citizens of America sought in their future 
system of government an assurance against the encroachments of a powerful despot.  The 
foremost concern was, of course, an executive with complete control over the government, 
especially the military.17  Americans were so worried about this possibility that under their first 
Constitution, the Articles of Confederation, they decided that, “the united states [sic] in congress 
assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and 
war.”18  Indeed, the Articles did not even provide for a sole executive.  The topic of foreign 
policy was heavily debated at the Constitutional Convention, as well as in the ensuing 
ratification arguments between federalists and anti-federalists.  At the convention, delegates such 
as James Madison, Elbridge Gerry, George Mason, and Roger Sherman argued about the 
                                                
15 Everett C. Ladd, “Foreword,” in: Sobel, ed., Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Controversy over Contra 
Aid, pp. ix-x. 
16 Youngstown Tube and Sheet Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), p. 634-635. 
<http://supreme.justia.com/us/343/579/case.html#634> (accessed 10 March 2010). 
17 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1969). 
18 Winton U. Solberg, ed., The Constitutional Convention and the Formation of the Union (Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 1990), p. 46. 
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efficacy of vesting the power to make war in the Congress, pointing out that that body was too 
deliberative and too slow to adequately protect the nation.19  The other side argued that giving 
the executive the power of war was contrary to the spirit of a republican democracy in the threats 
it posed. Ultimately, it was decided and accepted that the Congress has the power to declare war 
and control the appropriation of money for the armed forces, while the President is commander 
in chief of the armed forces.  In broad terms, Congress can declare war and decide how much 
money, if any at all, is to go towards the war effort, and the President has the authority to 
prosecute the war.20  The founders settled on a compromise – when it came to war, Congress and 
the President would share power. 
Even following the ratification of the Constitution, the issue was by no means settled.  
Various camps emerged on the continuum of executive versus legislative power in foreign 
affairs.  Alexander Hamilton believed in the “unitary executive,” namely that the executive held 
all powers delegated under executive authority (such as foreign policy), while Congress had 
enumerated powers.21  Others, like James Madison, held that the Congress was the predominant 
body, and therein held the real power when it came to foreign policy.22  It is a debate that has 
carried over through the centuries and into modern times.  John Yoo, who served in George W. 
Bush’s administration, is an example of a legal scholar who espouses a Hamiltonian-like view of 
the executive, whereas historians such as the eminent Garry Wills espouse Madison’s vision.  
Yoo believes that the executive has a vigorous, central role in modern foreign policy and that the 
growth of Presidential powers has been necessitated by historical circumstance; moreover, Yoo 
                                                
19 Yoo, Crisis and Command, p. 18.  Much has been made about the founding fathers’ original use of the word 
“make” and subsequent change to “declare.”  Some, like John Yoo, argue that the change to declare was intended to 
reduce the power of Congress in this situation, whereas others, like Wills, argue that the word “declare” 
unequivocally means “to commence,” and that it meant the same thing to the founders as it does to us. 
20 Solberg, ed.  The Constitutional Convention and the Formation of the Union, pg. 46. 
21 Yoo, Crisis and Command, p. xv.  
22 Garry Wills, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State (New York: Penguin Press, 
2010) p. 188. 
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argues that the framers intentionally created a strong executive, pointing to the failures of the 
Articles of Confederation and their use of New York’s governorship, the strongest executive 
model at the time, as the guide for the Presidency.23  Yoo sees the strongest displays of 
Presidential action, such as under Lincoln, Roosevelt, and George W. Bush, as appropriate uses 
of executive power, as opposed to atypical Presidential activity spurred by extraordinary 
circumstances.24  To the contrary, Garry Wills argues that the framers intended a much more 
limited role for the President in foreign policy making, and that presidential power has grown to 
a dangerously potent level.25  For him, the turning point was the creation of the atomic bomb 
(and existential threat) during World War II, after which, “an elaborately constructed set of 
institutions enforces the idea that anything executive agencies do is justified in the name of 
national security.”26  Others, like Arthur Schlesinger, point to a much longer historical tradition 
of encroachment of presidential power on congressional turf.27 
 
II.  The Reagan Administration 
This long-standing tension between executive and legislative predominance in the field of 
foreign affairs emerged saliently during the Reagan years.  It is clear that Ronald Reagan’s inner 
circle was of the view that the President needed greater latitude to make foreign policy decisions.  
Proponents of a strong executive hand in foreign policy were unequivocal in their belief that it 
was necessary for national security in the face of modern threats; they were adamant that past 
Congressional control of foreign policy had had disastrous outcomes.  Many Republican 
Congressmen at the time shared the Reagan administration’s views.  Reagan himself said, “You 
                                                
23 Yoo, Crisis and Command, pp. 19-52. 
24 Ibid., pp.xiv-xx. 
25 Wills, Bomb Power. 
26 Ibid., p. 53. 
27 Arthur Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 2004). 
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can’t have 535 members of the House and Senate administer foreign policy.  If the president 
doesn’t do what the people want him to do, they will let him know it.”28  John Tower, a U.S. 
Senator from Texas from 1961 until 1985, was of this school of thought. Tower was convinced 
that if “Congress tied the President’s hands” in the era of the Cold War nuclear stand-off, it 
would be akin to allowing the Axis powers to take control of the world in the 1930’s, perhaps the 
world’s greatest threat to security and liberty ever.29  Tower specifically resented the restrictions 
placed on Presidential power in the 1970’s such as the War Powers Resolution (1974) and the 
Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1961), arguing that they endangered America’s security.30  For the 
most part, Republicans in Congress and in the Reagan administration favored a stronger 
executive hand, particularly those that were preoccupied with national security.  They were in 
essence, modern-day Hamiltonians.  
On the other side of the spectrum, many Democrats in Congress felt strongly that the 
executive needed to be reigned in.31 Their views were heavily influenced by the nation’s 
experience in the Vietnam War.  Proponents of this perspective tended to emphasize the exertion 
of democratic will in foreign policy, which they believed the Congress was better able to capture 
than the President.  At the very least, these critics argued, Congress should be able to prevent the 
                                                
28 Richard Sobel, The Impact of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy Since Vietnam (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001).  
29 John G. Tower, “Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign 
Policy,” in Hyland ed., The Reagan Foreign Policy, (New York: Meridian Publishing, 1985), p. 148.   
30 Committee on Foreign Affairs, “The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents, Correspondence, Reports,” 
June 1981, United States Government Printing Office, David P. Auerswald and Peter F. Cowhey, “The War Powers 
Resolution and the Use of Force,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 41, no. 3 (1997): 505-528.  The War Powers 
Resolution was a framework laid out by Congress that essentially allowed the President of the United States to 
commit troops to combat without prior Congressional approval, so long as he gave the appropriate persons in 
Congress notice within 60 days of engaging troops.  Furthermore, it gave the Congress the power to terminate the 
President’s commitment of troops if it did not vote to within 120 days to explicitly authorize the military action.  
There were many dissenters in Congress to its passage in Congress and its constitutionality has not been resolved in 
the courts.  The Hughes-Ryan Amendment similarly requires the executive branch to notify Congress in a timely 
manner of any covert operations undertaken by intelligence agencies.  
31 Joel Brinkley and Stephen Engelberg eds., Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra 
Affair, with the Minority View (New York: Random House, Inc., 1988). 
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country from engaging in long-term, costly conflicts.  The standard-bearer of these Madisonians 
was Edward Boland, a representative from Massachusetts (D-MA, 1953-1989), and influential 
chairman of the House intelligence committee.32 
Then tension between Hamiltonians and Madisonians, then, can be boiled down to 
preoccupations with either national security imperatives or democratic restraint.  This is 
extremely important given the context leading up to the American involvement in Nicaragua.  
Each side can be assigned a seminal moment related to their preoccupation with war-making 
powers.  For those concerned about security, it was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.  For them, 
it represented a time when the United States inched away from all-out nuclear warfare.  It served 
as an example for why the executive required every foreign policy tool available to it.  For those 
worried about democratic restraint, the Vietnam War was clearly their watershed moment.  
Vietnam represented a time when executive decisions spiraled out of control and into one of the 
worst conflicts in American history.  These two events and these two opposing worldviews set 
the stage for the American involvement in Nicaragua.   
 
III. The Supreme Court 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States traditionally stays out of matters of foreign 
affairs.  There have been very few cases in this realm that the court has weighed in on.  
Ultimately, however, the court plays an extremely important role, because if there is to be an 
arbiter in this saga between the executive and legislative branches of government, it must be the 
judicial branch.  In this section, I analyze the most important foreign policy cases to come 
before the court and relate them to the Reagan administration’s confrontation with Congress. 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
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The first Supreme Court case with major implications on foreign policy making was 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation (1936), which was argued in the years leading up 
to World War II.33  The facts and circumstances of the case have proven to be quite 
inconsequential in the broader picture of American history, but the precedent set forth by the 
court was highly significant.  In 1934, a company known as Curtiss-Wright Corporation 
attempted to sell 15 machine guns to Bolivia, which was at the time engaged in a war.34  A Joint 
Resolution of Congress gave the President the authority to intervene and prohibit the sale if he 
felt it would contribute to establishment of peace in the area.  A lower court found that 
Congress’ resolution unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the executive.  The 
government appealed the ruling, and the case landed on the Supreme Court’s docket.35 
Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the court in which he reversed the lower 
court’s finding.  He argued that domestic affairs and foreign affairs were fundamentally 
different.36  In domestic affairs, he stated, the power of the federal government was carved from 
the power of the states, and therefore is specifically enumerated by the Constitution.37  In foreign 
affairs, power is not taken from the states, who have no role in foreign policy making, but rather, 
is part of the inherent sovereignty of the United States that passed from Great Britain to the 
colonies upon separation.  “Sovereignty is never held in suspense,” he argued, “when, therefore, 
the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed 
                                                
33 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, <http://supreme.justia.com/us/299/304/case.html> (accessed 
8 March 2011).  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Aaron Wildavsky, The Presidency (Boston: Little and Brown, 1969).  This concept put forth by Justice Sutherland 
is very similar to a well-known framework established by Wildavsky in 1969 known as “The Two Presidencies,” in 
which he argues and backs up with research, that the President is afforded much more latitude in the realm of 
foreign policy than in domestic affairs, and that in fact Congress supports the President much more often in foreign 
affairs than in domestic affairs.   
37 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., p. 315-316. 
 
 
 11 
to the Union.”38  The significance of this is that the President has powers in the realm of foreign 
policy that are not enumerated by the Constitution.  Because the President has better sources and 
information than Congress in this realm, and because of the efficacy of having one 
representative of the nation, as opposed to all of the members of Congress, Sutherland 
concludes, quoting Justice Marshall, that “the President of the United States is the sole organ of 
the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”39  Of 
particular interest to the case of Nicaragua, Sutherland also notes that, “secrecy in respect of 
information gathered by them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it 
productive of harmful results,” in a further nod to executive prerogative in covert operations.40 
Perhaps the most influential Supreme Court opinion pertaining to international relations 
is the concurring opinion written by Justice Jackson in the Youngstown Sheet and Tube 
Company v. Sawyer, also known as the “Steel Seizure Case.”41  The facts of the case pertain to 
actions taken by President Harry Truman during the Korean War.  A dispute between steel 
companies and the union representing their workers arose in 1952, threatening the nation’s 
production of weapons.  President Truman responded by ordering his Secretary of Commerce to 
seize the steel companies and recommence production of weapons for the war effort.  Justice 
Black delivered the opinion of the court in which he found Truman’s actions to be 
unconstitutional.42  While Black set the tone for the court, it was Jackson’s concurring opinion 
that has served as a guidepost for the court and the other branches more so than any other 
opinion written on foreign affairs.43 
                                                
38 Ibid., p. 317. 
39 Ibid., p. 319. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 
42 Ibid., p. 582. 
43 Geoffrey Stone et al., Constitutional Law, 6th ed., (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2009). 
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  Jackson’s opinion lays out the framework that he believes best captures the framers’ 
intentions for Congress’ arrangement with the President in foreign affairs.44  Jackson’s structure 
is based on his view of the coordination of the branches, “It [the Constitution] enjoins upon its 
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.  Presidential powers are 
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of 
Congress.”45  Jackson sets up three hypothetical scenarios involving the President and 
Congress.46  In the first scenario, Congress expressly or implicitly authorizes the President to 
undertake a specific action.  In this scenario, Jackson argues that the President’s power is at its 
zenith, and that there is little in the realm of foreign policy, with Congress’ assent, the President 
can do that is unconstitutional.  Jackson’s second scenario presupposes that Congress is tacit on 
a particular matter, and there is no indication one way or another as to Congress’ intention.  In 
this realm, the President has some power, although, “there is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which distribution is uncertain.”47  This is the 
zone with the least clarity, and likely the zone under which the majority of cases exist, until 
Congress takes action.  The final scenario is the one in which the President’s power “is at its 
lowest ebb,” when his will is incompatible with Congressional decree.48  In this sphere, there is 
little that can justify presidential action, as according to Jackson, “what is at stake is the 
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.”49 
 Whereas Justice Black finds Truman’s actions unconstitutional because he believes they 
are a usurpation of legislative power, Justice Jackson uses his framework to come to a 
                                                
44 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, p. 634. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., pp. 635-637. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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decision.50  Jackson argues that due to Congress’ passage of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which 
essentially legislated Congress’ control over union and labor issues, President Truman’s actions 
fall within the third realm of Presidential power.  He then expounds on the dangers of violating 
the expressed will of Congress, invoking the fall of both the Weimar Republic and the First 
French Republic to make his point.51  Jackson is unequivocal – the President does not have the 
authority to upset the precious balance set up by the Constitution, particularly in matters of 
foreign affairs.  Justice Jackson’s decision was upheld and his framework was used to settle a 
later case, Dames & Moore v. Regan, wherein President Carter’s power to freeze certain Iranian 
assets during the Iranian hostage crisis was called into question.52  Justice Rehnquist, who wrote 
the decision for the court, finished, “We can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the 
President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such 
claims.”53       
                                                
50 Ibid. , p. 582, 638. 
51 Ibid., p. 651. 
52 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), <http://supreme.justia.com/us/453/654/case.html> (accessed 
March 5, 2011). 
53 Ibid., p. 688. 
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Background of U.S . involvement in Nicaragua 
 
“Imperialism’s current military aggression is the continuation of a long history: 130 years of intervention and 
aggression by various U.S. administrations.” 
 -Dr. Rafael Chamorro, The Charges Brought by Nicaragua Against the U.S. Government54 
 
CIA covert operations in 1981 were not the first time the United States became involved 
with Nicaragua.  The United States and Nicaragua have had a long, intertwined history, first 
beginning as Nicaragua emerged as a nation-state.55  America asserted its self-proclaimed 
authority over countries in its “backyard” with the Monroe doctrine in 1823, stating that further 
encroachment by European powers in the Western Hemisphere would be met by American 
intervention.56  America’s right to meddle in the affairs of Central American countries was 
established early.  In the 1850’s, an American named William Walker attempted to take over the 
country and name himself head-of-state.  His attempt was short-lived, but not forgotten by 
Nicaraguans.57  Another crucial moment was at the beginning of the 20th century, which featured 
two American interventions and occupations of Nicaragua.  The later intervention led to the rise 
of the Somoza family dictatorship that lasted until 1979 and to the death of guerilla rebel General 
Augusto Sandino, the anti-imperial folk hero who became the inspiration for the “Sandinista” 
party against whom Reagan’s war was fought.58          
Over the ensuing decades, the U.S. government became perhaps as comfortable with the 
Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, and later his son Anastasio Somoza Debayle, as it had 
become with many other Latin American dictators.59  Life under Somoza in Nicaragua was 
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characterized by graft and greed for those fortunate enough to be in the Somoza clan’s inner 
circle.  The primary reason that the United States tolerated him was out of fear that a revolution 
might rise up in his absence, as he was one of America’s many “friendly dictators” in the 
region.60  In 1972, a key event sparked a gradual mobilization against the Somoza regime that 
would eventually lead to its toppling in 1979.  The event was a catastrophic earthquake that hit 
Managua.  As copious amounts of foreign aid poured into Nicaragua fund the recovery effort and 
humanitarian disaster, the extent of Somoza Debayle’s greed became apparent and intolerable.  
The events that unfolded were the beginnings of a broad and all-encompassing revolution that 
would force Somoza out and sweep the Sandinistas into power.  While the revolution began as a 
fairly broad democratic coalition, a number of fortuitous events combined with the cold 
calculation of the Sandinistas allowed them to consolidate power and gain a virtual stranglehold 
on the Nicaraguan government.61 
President Jimmy Carter, who had previously supported the Somoza regime with aid in the 
expectation that its human rights record would improve, contributed $75 million to the fledgling 
Sandinista government, hoping that it would become more moderate.62  Not only did Carter’s 
policy fail, but major changes were coming to the American political system as well.  The 
gradual consolidation of the Sandinistas’ power and the vociferation of their socialist beliefs ran 
up against Ronald Reagan’s rise to the office of the Presidency in 1981.  His Cold War ideology 
played a crucial role in the rapidly changing relationship of America to Nicaragua.  Reagan 
believed that the Sandinistas were an intolerable, left-leaning government in America’s 
backyard, and that the United States should be doing everything in its power to support the 
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opposition, the so-called contras (short for “contrarevolucionarios,” which means counter-
revolutionaries in Spanish).  Reagan was surrounded by like-minded people, including his 
Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, who held similar views about the containment of 
communism in the region and nuclear deterrence.63  His Secretary of State, George Shultz, 
shared the conviction that allowing the Sandinistas to maintain control would be like allowing a 
scourge to fester in America’s backyard.64  The administration’s approach can be summed up by 
the “The Reagan doctrine,” first enunciated by Charles Krauthammer in Time magazine in 1985, 
which essentially states that the United States would overtly and unabashedly support groups 
attempting to overthrow communist or socialist regimes everywhere in the world.65  Reagan’s 
assumption of the Presidency must not be understated, as “The Reagan doctrine” differed greatly 
from Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy centered on human rights. Reagan historian Sean Wilentz 
has even argued that “breaking with the past” was a major theme in Reagan’s campaign and 
presidency, and perhaps most evident in the realm of foreign policy.66  Reagan’s break with the 
past on Nicaragua when he entered office is where the intervention began to test American 
constitutional boundaries.      
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The Constitution and America’s Involvement in Nicaragua 
 
 
“Since the Vietnam War we have had this growing involvement by the legislative branch in the details of foreign 
policy that – you can make a constitutional argument – are properly left to the president.  When you do that, you 
drive him in the direction of using other techniques to achieve objectives.” 
 
-National Security Council member, 198167 
 
“We cannot know too much about this case history of the thin line that separates the legitimate from the 
illegitimate exercise of power in our government.” 
 
-Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line, 1991 68 
 
 
The explosion of media coverage over the Iran-Contra scandal was instrumental in 
exposing some of the executive overreach in conducting foreign affairs – but that is not where 
the story began.  The drama between the Reagan administration and the Democratic majority in 
the House of Representatives on Nicaragua started with Reagan’s first actions in Nicaragua 
during his first year as President, eventually culminating in the events we now know as the Iran-
Contra affair.  The entire back-and-forth is instrumental to the story.  As we trace the to-and-fro 
of executive and legislative actions, we examine their constitutionality and analyze various 
players’ claims to American national security and democratic will. 
Ronald Reagan took office on January 28, 1981.  Everything about President Reagan 
denoted a marked difference with his predecessor.69  The soft-spoken Carter contrasted with the 
supremely confident Reagan as much as Carter’s emphasis on human rights differed from 
Reagan’s obsession with containing communism.  Reagan believed that his electoral mandate in 
the 1980 election not only gave him the power to drastically change course on domestic 
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economic policy, but also to adopt a firm anti-leftist posture in Nicaragua.70  He was determined 
to ensure the Sandinistas failed and began extremely early in his Presidency to use the resources 
as his disposal to support the contras.    
Reagan’s first action in Nicaragua in 1981 on behalf of the contra cause was a series of 
covert operations by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), unbeknownst to the American 
people and, for a time, to Congress.  Where exactly did the CIA derive the authority to 
undertake these operations?  The answer is that the CIA was authorized directly by the President 
of the United States.  On March 9, 1981, only a couple of months after taking office, President 
Ronald Reagan issued a top secret Presidential finding, in which he authorized the CIA to 
undertake actions beyond the scope of mere intelligence collection in Central America.71  The 
portions of the finding that are declassified call for “all forms of training, equipment, and related 
assistance” for “cooperating governments” in Central America.  Intentionally vague in writing 
the finding, the President gave the CIA broad interpretive power in implementing his finding. 
But later in the year, on December 1, Reagan issued a further Presidential finding, giving the 
CIA even broader power and a specific budget framework within which to work.  Arguing that it 
was important to the national security, Reagan authorized the CIA to “support and conduct 
paramilitary operations against Nicaragua.”72  In plain words, the President of the United States 
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authorized covert military action against the recognized government of Nicaragua without 
consulting Congress, or informing the American public.73  
What of the constitutionality of this order by President Reagan?  In what ways did it 
enhance national security or detract from democratic governance?  Reagan’s finding was by no 
means a declaration of war, and therefore did not necessitate an official declaration by Congress.  
Nonetheless, American agents were committed to operate in a foreign country without 
Congressional authorization or direct funding.  Reagan used non-appropriated money for the 
mission.  Anticipating that there would be times when a President would take quick and decisive 
action, Congress allowed for this in Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, known 
as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment.74  In essence, Congress allows the President, and the President 
only, to authorize covert operations by the CIA if he deems it “important to the national security 
of the United States,” and he notifies Congress in a “timely fashion.”  For the purposes of 
accountability, the President must issue a Presidential Finding, to prove that he authorized and 
had knowledge of the order.            
   While few might have seen the Sandinista regime, as it existed in 1981, as an imminent 
threat to the national security of the United States of America, in the eyes and worldview of 
Ronald Reagan, opposing this regime was instrumental to keeping the United States safe.  It is 
indisputable that there was significant Cuban support of the fledgling regime.75  However, 
Cuban meddling came in addition to many other outside influences that were attempting to push 
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the regime in many directions.  For instance, the Carter administration authorized millions of 
dollars to go towards the new regime in the hopes that it would embrace a more moderate 
ideology.  For Reagan to use a Presidential Finding to authorize covert CIA action required that 
he believe the situation posed imminent danger to national security.  Regardless of Cuban, 
Soviet, or any other ties, the acting government of Nicaragua was harmless to the United States 
in 1981.  Even in the Reagan worldview, Nicaragua’s hostile posture may have eventually posed 
a threat to the United States, but certainly not of an immediate and outright danger.  Therefore, it 
seems logical to conclude that Reagan misused his power under the Hughes-Ryan amendment.  
Furthermore, it seems likely that he used the tactic of a secret Presidential finding simply in 
order to avoid having to gain the approval of a skeptical Congress or sell the idea to a combat-
weary American public.  Reagan’s misuse of the power does not mean that the President should 
not have this tool at his disposal.  To the contrary, this tool, if used appropriately, seems a useful 
and necessary part of a President’s ability to keep the nation safe.  It merely illustrates that in 
this instance it was not employed in the spirit in which it was crafted by Congress.     
     In early 1982, news stories began to break of the CIA’s involvement in Nicaragua, 
prompting furor by some House representatives.76  The result was an amendment to the House 
Defense Appropriations bill for the fiscal year 1983 introduced by Democratic Representative 
Edward Boland of Massachusetts that later became known as the first Boland Amendment or 
(“Boland I”).  The amendment stated “None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by 
the Central Intelligence Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, 
military training or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual, 
not a part of a country’s armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the government of 
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Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.”77  This 
amendment was rather clearly intended to block further American military involvement in 
Nicaragua.  Boland, and Congress, were attempting to exert their Madisonian ideal of 
Congressional primacy of foreign policy.  Hamiltonian hawks within the Reagan administration 
interpreted it rather differently. 
Those in the administration with strong convictions about the necessity of the operations 
in Nicaragua did not simply roll over and bow to the wishes of Congress and the Boland 
amendment.  Instead, they worked their way around the amendment.  There are two parts of the 
amendment that those within the administration who wanted to keep the covert action going 
exploited.78  First and foremost, while the amendment specifically prevented the CIA and the 
DOD (Department of Defense) from action, it did not mention the National Security Council 
(NSC).  This immediately shifted the administration’s focus from CIA operations to the NSC 
taking the lead, in particular Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North (an NSC staffer), Deputy National 
Security Advisor John Poindexter, and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane.  Secondly, 
the amendment stated that the U.S. could not engage militarily “for the purpose of overthrowing 
the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and 
Honduras,” which the administration read to mean that military action could be taken so long as 
its purpose was neither of the ones stated specifically in the wording. 
Because the amendment did not explicitly mention the NSC by name, the planning and 
operations began to be funneled through the NSC and its leaders.  A constitutionally powerless 
entity, the NSC was established in 1947 under the National Security Act to provide the President 
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of the United States with a group of advisors on matters of national security.  It was the 
responsibility of the NSC to advise the President and coordinate policy through various 
executive branch departments.79  There is no authority vested in the NSC to actually undertake 
or authorize any military action, simply to “coordinate” it.  In fact, it is likely for this reason that 
the authors of the bill felt no need to mention the NSC as an entity since it was unauthorized to 
take military action.  In the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair, it became clear that Oliver North, 
who essentially took command of the operation in Nicaragua, worked in conjunction with 
foreign non-military personnel, and selected members of the CIA, to carry out the support of the 
Contras.  Poindexter was quoted as saying, North “was the switching point that made the whole 
system work…I viewed Ollie as the kingpin to the Central American opposition once the CIA 
was restricted.”80  It is hard to rationalize the great lengths taken by the Reagan administration to 
continue supporting the Contras in the name of national security.  The Congress was well-
informed of the situation and deemed it inappropriate and unnecessary that the United States 
participate militarily.  North and others deliberately ignored the “spirit” of the law and created 
loopholes to continue action.  On the second apparent loophole, the “overthrowing” clause, the 
logic and truth were very clearly stretched to accommodate a questionable endeavor.  The entire 
purpose of the contra insurgency was to overthrow the Sandinista government, therefore any 
military support of the counterinsurgency was by definition “for the purpose of overthrowing the 
government of Nicaragua.” 
Despite the clear message of the Boland amendment from the U.S. Congress, secret 
American operations in Nicaragua were ongoing throughout fiscal year 1983.  The amendment 
was renewed for the following year.  The only difference was that only $27 million was 
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appropriated by Congress for American operations in Nicaragua (supposedly humanitarian aid 
and logistical support), a fact that would play an important role later as the Iran-contra scandal 
fully emerged.  In the interim, however, news reports out of Nicaragua made it clear that the 
United States was very much still involved in supporting the Contra’s cause militarily, despite 
the restrictions of the first Boland amendment.  House Democrats grew increasingly irritated at 
the Reagan administration’s apparent disregard of Congress’ restriction, and began making 
plans to prohibit all funding for Nicaragua (the so called Boland-Zablocki bill).81  
Administration officials were still hopeful that they could convince Congress to provide them 
with more money for Nicaragua.82   
In April of 1984, a game-changing revelation was made.83  It became publicly known that 
under direction of Oliver North, the CIA, and foreign contractors, the United States had mined 
the harbor of Managua, outraging the Nicaraguan government and shocking the world.84  A 
declassified memorandum from North (and NSC-staff associate Constantine Menges) to 
McFarlane, proved North’s orchestration of the event and the President’s knowledge of it.  It 
stated, “Our intention is to severely disrupt the flow of shipping essentials to Nicaraguan trade 
in this peak export period...No American citizen will be directly involved in the operational 
event.”  Finally, in perhaps the most damning line of the document, North wrote, 
“Recommendation that you approve this operation and brief the President using the points 
above.”  McFarlane initialed and checked “approve,” indicating that the President was fully 
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briefed on the plans to mine the Nicaraguan harbor.85  Three months later, Congress fired back 
with what became known as Boland II, an all out prohibition on funding for operations in 
Nicaragua.  This became a turning point in the administration’s efforts to fund its activity in 
Nicaragua. 
Congress passed Boland II in late 1984 to apply to fiscal year 1985.  It stated, “During 
fiscal year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of 
Defense, or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities 
may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, 
directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, 
organization, movement, or individual.”86  In as plain language as possible, and addressing any 
potential ambiguities that the first Boland amendment may have left open, this amendment 
effectively choked off any attempt by the administration to support the Contras.  Or so Congress 
and the American people thought.  But before engaging the illegality that ensued, which is 
known as the Iran-Contra scandal, we must first deconstruct Boland II as it pertains to the 
Constitution. 
   In restricting all funding for operations in Nicaragua, the Congress exercised its most 
fundamental control over the conduct of foreign policy, the power of the purse.  It is this critical 
check on executive power in the foreign policy arena that prevents the executive branch from 
simply doing as it pleases.  Some Reagan hardliners took objection to the amendment, claiming 
that it was unconstitutional to limit the President’s ability to conduct war.  This objection is 
fundamentally flawed, because it is exactly the check that Congress has over the executive 
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branch that is expressly written into the Constitution.  It, in fact, constitutionally limits the 
President’s ability to conduct war.  From the standpoint of national security, were an emergency 
to befall the situation in Nicaragua such as the discovery of Soviet nuclear weapons, the 
President would be unable to act swiftly and covertly due to the prohibition by Congress.  
However, the risks to liberty would also be great, simply allowing a President unfettered control 
over the military.  Therefore, barring any freak doomsday scenarios, the Congressional check 
over executive authority is a basic and critical component of the national security apparatus. 
The mess that befell the Reagan administration hardliners who still believed strongly in 
supporting the Contras after Boland II elicited two responses from the Reagan administration: 
first, a public diplomacy campaign directed at the public and members of Congress; and second, 
an illegal operation whose goal it was to solicit private funds from donors and illegal weapons 
sales to Iran.  Both bring up important Constitutional questions.  In public, the Reagan 
administration went on the offensive, beginning right after Boland I and the drying up of funds 
in 1984.  In April of 1983, Ronald Reagan had addressed a Joint Session of Congress, urging 
action on Nicaragua. In a poignant line, he attempts to bring others to his side: “To those who 
invoke the memory of Vietnam: There is no thought of sending American combat troops to 
Central America; they are not needed – indeed, they have not been requested there.  All our 
neighbors ask of us is assistance in training and arms to protect themselves while they build a 
better, freer life.”87  The President knew he would have to win over members of Congress and 
the skeptical public, whose support remained thin throughout the entire episode, with opposition 
to U.S. aid by majorities of 50 to 60 percent.88   
                                                
87 Ronald Reagan, “Address to Joint Session of Congress,” 27 April 1983 in: Leiken et al. ed., The Central 
American Crisis Reader, pp. 548-554. 
88 Sobel, ed.  Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 11. 
 
 
 26 
An important examination of the Reagan administration’s efforts at persuading the public 
elicits the question as to “how far is too far?”89  As Larry Storrs and Nina Serafino note, it is 
critical to determine “the extent to which those efforts exceeded persuasion and constituted 
manipulation and intimidation to obtain an anti-democratic result.”90  The administration took a 
number of steps to convince the public.  Reagan formed a National Bipartisan Commission on 
Central America led by Henry Kissinger; he spoke passionately about the Contras in his 1985 
State of the Union Address and the administration created special outreach (“public diplomacy”) 
efforts through the White House Office of Public Liaison and the State Department Office of 
Public Diplomacy.91  This last effort prompted critics to decry the administration’s efforts as 
propaganda. If the President believes the case to be a matter of national security, is it not 
permissible for him to elicit public support in order to pursue the matter through legal channels?  
It seems that the President has every right to attempt to persuade the public, and that this is one 
of the most preferable methods available to a President in a democracy.   
The question as to “how far is too far,”92 is a difficult one to answer.  At issue here, seems 
to be what resources the President should be allowed to use and devote to persuading his fellow 
citizens.  Interestingly enough, Storrs and Serafino show that the President’s efforts had little to 
no effect on the public, but are widely thought to have contributed to a reinstating of funds for 
Nicaragua in 1985 and 1986 by Congress.  An undeniable tipping point was the revelation that 
Daniel Ortega, the newly-elected President of Sandinista Nicaragua, took a trip to the Soviet 
Union in 1985.  The Reagan administration pounced upon this information, portraying the 
Sandinistas as dangerous Communists in the dark shadow of the Soviet Union’s Marxism.  
                                                
89 K. Larry Storrs and Nina Serafino, “The Reagan Administration’s Efforts to Gain Support for Contra Aid,” in:  
Sobel, ed.  Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 36. 
90 Ibid., p. 36. 
91 Ibid., p. 39. 
92 Ibid. 
 
 
 27 
Reagan also took the opportunity to laud the contras (who were by no accounts model 
humanitarians), at one point calling them “the moral equivalent of the founding fathers.”93  
While the efforts at public diplomacy raise few constitutional questions, there is no 
question that the secret attempts to procure money from the sale of arms to Iran for the contra 
cause was illegal.  As the main goal of this paper is to explore the light that the Nicaragua case 
sheds on executive versus legislative roles in foreign policy making, the minutiae of the Iran-
contra scandal are not explored here in any depth.  Many instructive and in-depth investigations 
of Iran-contra already exist.94  The aim here, rather, is to show which elements of the scandal 
were particularly dangerous to the delicate balance between Congress and the President, and 
how they were made possible.   
On Tuesday, November 25, 1986, President Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese 
held a press conference regarding the scandal that was beginning to emerge.  The details the 
White House released were succinct and manipulated.95  In short, the United States had sold 
weapons to Israel, who in turn sold them to Iran (in exchange for the hostages), and used the 
profit to support the contra insurgency in Nicaragua.  In the aftermath, Admiral Poindexter 
resigned from the NSC, Oliver North was released from duty, and President Reagan had not 
been “fully informed,” and therefore claimed seeming innocence.  In the trials and investigations 
that ensued, it became clear that virtually no one involved in the scandal was forthright about 
their roles.96  Even President Reagan conveniently claimed to have forgotten certain episodes 
that would have implicated him in the faulty decision-making.  Declassified documents show 
                                                
93 Storrs and Serafino, “The Reagan Administration’s Efforts to Gain Support for Contra Aid,” p. 144. 
94 See Theodore Draper, The Very Thin Line, Michael Ledeen, Perilous Statecraft, and Oliver Trager ed., Iran-
Contra Arms Scandal. 
95 Draper, The Very Thin Line, pp. 541-546. 
96 Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, p. 236.  Oliver North admitted to shredding incriminating documents following 
public knowledge of the events. 
 
 
 28 
that the idea of involving third parties in the operations slowly evolved over time as Boland II 
severely hampered the administration’s efforts in Nicaragua.  For example, in an NSC document 
from early 1985, among the many options being advocated for, North presents “the solicitation 
of third-country support,” for the carrying out of lethal operations and weapons support.97  The 
Iran-Contra affair was merely the culmination of these plans. 
There are two specific elements of Iran-contra that are particularly alarming in the 
context of the U.S. Constitution’s restrictions.  First and foremost, the executive branch, in 
secretly deciding that its options were being unfairly limited by Congress with respect to 
military action in Nicaragua, sought alternate means of securing funding for their mission.  The 
Constitution is clear that Congress has exclusive control of the federal government’s 
expenditures, and that if Congress has not appropriated funds for a particular cause, then the 
government cannot pursue its funding through other means.  In Article I, Section 9 of the 
Constitution, “No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of 
appropriations made by law.”98  Congress’ power of the purse is the ultimate check on 
Presidential power.  Any attempt to circumvent this power is a major usurpation of 
constitutional authority.  The Reagan administration attempted to do this in two ways.  First and 
foremost, members of the administration lobbied private parties to donate funds for the 
government to use in helping the Contras (such as the Sultan of Brunei and beer magnate Joseph 
Coors).99  Oliver North spent significant time traveling around the world to solicit private 
donations.  Secondly, through indirect arms sales to Iran, North, with approval from Poindexter, 
                                                
97 Oliver North Memorandum to Robert McFarlane, NSC, 15 January 1985, Iran-Contra Affair Collection, Item 
IC00725, DNSA, 
<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com.libproxy.tulane.edu:2048/cat/displayItemImages.doqueryType=cat&ResultsID=12
7C2BD93CB1&ItemNumber=54&ItemID=&&imageNumber=3#imageTop> (accessed 25 April 2010). 
98 Brinkley/Engelberg, eds., Report of the Congressional Committees, p. 348. 
99 Draper, The Very Thin Line, p. 521. 
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and likely Reagan himself, skimmed money that technically belonged to the United States 
government, by diverting it through the CIA to the Nicaraguan Contras.100  In the grand scheme 
of things, the executive branch attempted to force an agenda using money that the Constitution 
prohibited it from using.  These actions unquestionably harmed both the national security 
interest and democracy.          
 
                                                
100 Brinkley and Engelberger, Report of Committees Investigating Iran-Contra Affair, p. 271. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Ultimately, in a twist of fate for the Reagan administration, funding was restored for 
operations in Nicaragua for the fiscal years 1986 and 1987 in the face of blatant illegality and 
disregard for constitutional checks.101  Ironically, the testimony of Oliver North before a joint 
congressional committee played out extremely favorably for the Reagan administration, winning 
enough public support to essentially repeal the Boland amendments.  This outcome, however, is 
not indicative of the lessons that must be drawn from the Reagan administration’s foray into 
Nicaragua.   
 The Reagan administration’s actions in Nicaragua over its eight years in power amounted 
to constant attempts to circumvent Congressional checks on its power in the realm of foreign 
policy.  The effort began with an entirely new departure from the previous administration with 
the advent of the “Reagan doctrine,” whereby the administration overtly voiced its support for 
organizations and peoples working to overthrow socialist or communist regimes.102  This 
translated into secret Presidential orders mandating covert action through the CIA, and the use 
of legitimate foreign policy tools available to the executive (i.e. through the Hughes-Ryan 
amendment), for the purposes of getting around a skeptical Congress and reluctant American 
public.  As Congress caught wind of these actions, it attempted to clamp down on the 
administration’s escalating involvement in Nicaragua through the first Boland amendment.  This 
led to further actions by the administration to get around Congress.  The administration took 
advantage of semantics and used non-appropriated money and funneled it through the NSC and 
a few hard-line operatives.  Again Congress retaliated with the second Boland amendment.  In 
response, the administration took illegal measures to procure private funds and weapons for the 
                                                
101 Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, p. 240.   
102 Krauthammer, “The Reagan Doctrine.” 
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contras through illicit weapons sales to Iran in return for hostages.  This final attempt at getting 
around Congress was the most egregious, as it violated one of the most basic principles of the 
separation of powers in the Constitution, namely that the Congress shall have control of the 
purse. 
 The importance of the two centuries-old debate about balance of power among the 
coequal branches of the Constitution cannot be overstated, especially in a time when the intent 
of the founders, and the relevance of that intent, is vigorously debated as to its significance for 
current public policy.  History has shown that the delicate balance between Congress and the 
executive in the realm of foreign policy can be influenced and swayed by the context of the 
moment.  American intervention in Nicaragua, is itself evidence of this.  In an age where there 
are novel threats to security and to liberty with every passing moment, the stakes are 
exceedingly high. 
President Barack Obama, whose ideological worldview stands in stark contrast to that of 
Ronald Reagan, came under quite heavy criticism by members of Congress in late March of 
2011 for authorizing the use of force in Libya.103  His critics argued that his actions necessitated 
congressional approval, and that they stood in stark contrast to his enunciated understanding of 
executive power before becoming President, once stating, “The President does not have power 
under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not 
involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”104  Obama’s administration 
responded to the criticisms by distinguishing between limited military intervention and the 
commencement of war, once again reigniting the debate that has yet to be resolved, but seems to 
be growing ever-more significant.      
                                                
103 Charlie Savage, “Attack Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent,” New York Times, March 21, 2011. 
104 Charlie Savage, “Barack Obama’s Q&A,” The Boston Globe, December 20, 2007. 
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What conclusions can be drawn then from the Nicaraguan case about the appropriate 
relationship between Congress and the President in the realm of foreign policy?  First and 
foremost, it indicates that the complexity of foreign policy necessitates a complex relationship 
between the executive and the legislative branches, but one that must be clearly enunciated, 
agreed upon, and followed.  Simply siding with Hamiltonians or Madisonians is not the solution.   
In this case, an executive who attempted to push his power too far by being too Hamiltonian was 
rebuked by an attentive Congress, led by a Madisonian Massachusetts representative with strong 
convictions about the role of the president in shaping foreign policy.  A sound framework for 
Congressional-executive cooperation in foreign policy requires a number of things.  First of all, 
an executive must have the flexibility to engage militarily without prior approval by Congress, 
especially given the special pressures emanating from modern, nuclear warfare. The framers 
intended to give the executive branch this latitude to repel threats, and understood its necessity 
for the protection and well being of the nation. However, the framers did not include provisions 
to deal with abuses of this power. Therefore, this engagement must be checked by immediate 
and frequent notification of the appropriate committees in Congress.105  Perhaps the most 
important lesson to be taken from the Iran-Contra scandal, is that strong convictions combined 
with secret activities can quickly be blown out of proportion and lead down a dangerous path.  
Secondly, as determined by the courts and in accordance with the spirit of the balance of 
powers, if the executive and the Congress cannot come to a consensus on a military operation 
already initiated by a President, the action must cease.  If the danger to the national security is 
great enough, the executive must be able to make the case to the people, through their direct 
representatives in Congress.  Finally, the Congress must always have the option available to it to 
                                                
105 Diclerico, The American President, 5th ed, pp. 38-41  As Diclerico notes, the War Powers Act attempts to do just 
this; however, it has been ignored almost categorically by every single President since it was passed over Nixon’s 
veto. 
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prevent military engagement by a president by controlling the funds required to engage 
militarily.  The President should have no means available to pursue military engagement other 
than through the resources provided by Congress.  There are elements of this arrangement that 
the founding fathers could not have foreseen, therefore care must be taken to preserve the 
original intent of the balance of power in the modern context of foreign policy making even in 
the nuclear age.  Only then, can both the security and the liberty of the American people be 
assured.   
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